A manifesto for Atlanticism.
The case for the American world order.
It is a sorry throneroom indeed which has no court to proclaim its majesty. A vast but empty expanse will not ennoble a domain without subjects that honor and extol it. Such would America’s grandiose leadership of the world be without the stalwart Atlantic alliance–the alliance between the United States of America and its European peers, especially those nations in Western Europe, such as France and Britain, which are America’s age-old allies and co-creators of multiple post-war world orders. This relationship, solidified by an emotional bond rooted in common values and cultural ties, has vindicated the American system, supported its strategic interests and, sine qua non, has ratified its creed throughout history. Europe has thus been the international standard-bearer of American values. That is not to say it has been servile nor a crony–and indeed there have been even acute differences of policy–but its resolute support amplified America’s voice by the weight of Europe’s cultural and moral significance to the world. That Europe–the mother of innumerable nations, philosophies, indeed the modern world–would bestow its imprimatur upon America’s vision constitutes an unmatched boon to the reception of America’s ideas by other parts of the world. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it an immediate and mutual threat, the two continents have begun to drift away. America’s erstwhile brother, Europe, is increasingly self-identifying as its own bloc with its own strategic interest ever since the collapse of the USSR, especially necessitated by America’s recent tendency to abjure Atlantic nations and to turn inward–a tendency more palpable in recent years. But to understand the evolving nature of the American-European alliance, one must understand its foundations as well as the ever-changing nature of the Europe we are dealing with. What presents itself as its modern raison d’être? Is it tending toward a united European state? And most importantly, how shall America approach the reinvigoration of an Atlantic alliance, lest it abdicate its throne of world leadership? Prima facie, this issue seems to be one of anodyne policy. However, this European question, though subtly, adumbrates the futures of American leadership and Western civilization. America may continue to be the City on a Hill, illuminating the world, or it may discover that it shall be unable to rival the Chinese polarity alone. The West may rediscover moral purpose and with it, unity, or its sun may finally set–rather, eclipsed by the emerging Red Sun in the east.
As America emerged from its characteristic isolation and shed its inward disposition by joining the First World War, it had done so with an unshakeable conviction that it was the steward of humanity. Europe, having been beleaguered by constant and vicious infighting, required saving by this society of the free, which now had the economic and military power to back its idealistic outlook. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed out in his seminal work, “Diplomacy,” that America’s splendid isolation and lack of peer competitors throughout its history cultivated a mindset among Americans that they were destined for greatness, and even hegemony. Indeed, the United States of America had never participated in a truly international system until it dipped its toes in it under President Theodore Roosevelt, who, out of his desire for American world power, mediated the resolution of the Russo-Japanese War. This inclination eventually culminated in America’s wholesale thrust upon the international system under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Unlike his European counterparts, he was not principally motivated by a calculation of national interest, but rather a desire to redesign the world according to American values–rule of law, adjudication, and self-determination. Wilson envisioned the spread of democracy and freedom as necessary for world peace, in contradistinction to Machiavellian power politics–the very origins of the interminable European fratricide. Wilson–and America as a whole–carried with him the aforementioned belief in the superiority of the American system and a devout repudiation of Old World power politics. This national psychology was nurtured by a century and a half of undisturbed hegemony and unchallenged expansion, for America knew no other power. It was always its own master and a lord over its neighbors in every right, save a brief prologue during its infancy. An unalloyed belief in American exceptionalism thus defined the American outlook in all matters, including foreign policy. It was poised to construct a new world order, and thus it did. President Wilson codified the founding principles of the League of Nations, though American society was not prepared to join it at the time. America’s invaluable support for the victors of the First World War influenced its grateful beneficiaries to see in the Wilsonian vision a chance for peace–a new beginning free from unceasing conflicts.
But how did America’s European interlocutors receive its positioning of itself as a new leader? America throwing its titanic military and economic weight on the side of the Allies endowed America with potent leverage. America’s decisive participation in the war saved the Entente from its precarious situation, rescuing war-weary France from complete exhaustion and merited the admiration and gratitude of her fellow Anglo power, Britain. A significant catalyst for the American-led Transatlantic alliance was the convergence of American and British interests in the pursuance of a total German defeat, albeit for different reasons. The American leadership’s belief in the universality of democracy and its framework for peace–per Wilson’s radical vision for a peaceful and cooperative world order–required the utter destruction of German institutions, markedly monarchical and autocratic in character. The German Kaiserreich as it existed would be palpably incongruous with a post-war American democratic dictat. As such, German civil society’s utter transformation was paramount.The British, on the other hand, fought for wholesale German capitulation, convinced Germany was categorically a revisionist nation. The power of Imperial Germany would thus inherently contravene Franco-British interests, constituting a polarity that would destabilize the entire continent. Germany, clinging to the lessons it learned under the rigid tutelage of von Bismarck, saw hegemony as the greatest defense of its dreaded isolation. Greater still, continental dominance was viewed as a natural consequence of its large population and superior industry. Naturally, then, the British, in their traditional role as the police of Europe–the quintessential balancer, as it were–sought the utmost dismantling of Germany’s capacity to subvert the balance of power. The two great and leading powers of the Allied victory, the United States and Britain, were united in objective. The Anglo-American alliance was poised to collect their strategic bargaining chips gained by their war efforts and relative power and design a world order. Ever intransigent France was reluctant to accept the American interposition and with it, its promises of a rules-based order that secured peace through understanding. Clearing a mountain of corpses to take its seat at the negotiating table, France preferred tangible security guarantees, not belles lettres, to safeguard against the possibility of Germany rekindling their eternal enmity. This hesitancy was soon abated by an Anglo-American guarantee in intervening to save France should Germany attack France; of course this was, in fact, enabled by the shared conviction among America and Britain that Germany would never be in such a position of strength again. By this point, however, France in its weary state had little choice. It could participate as a leading member or be relegated to the periphery. United, this triumphant trinity of France, Britain, and America, testified to the transfer of power to the Transatlantic. Foundations for an American-centric European alliance were being laid. By contrast, Central and East Europe–rife with political convulsion at the conclusion of the war–were now tertiary.
Britain and France having acquiesced, the stage that was the Paris Peace Conference was set for Wilson’s final act: the League of Nations. Indeed, this was unprecedented and the concept would not have obtained the impetus nor credibility to achieve the League’s founding signatories without the Franco-British recognition of the importance of the new rules-based order. Suffice to say, the recent victory of those two nations buttressed their policy. Were America alone in its pontification, the world may have dismissed its musings as a victor drunk with power. Indeed, they may have seen America as a naive newcomer to international politics, a giant waking from its slumber stumbling around in its somnolent stupor. But America’s partners, experienced in international systems, vindicated America’s designs by the magnitude of their reception. Consensus among powers made possible the Wilsonian vision, just as consensus among the scientific community ushers in new doctrines. What was the League of Nations in essence? It was an appendage of American thought. The belief not in the security found in raw power, but in law. Just as America’s interior society was a nation of laws, not men, the League of Nations similarly envisioned a world of laws and treaties, not statesmen. This magnified the influence of the United States to inestimable proportions. Had America codified its victory in the language of power, as the habits of its Old World peers may have done, it would have been another conqueror awaiting its displacement by yet another. But speaking in the language of reason, indeed appealing to the heart by speaking of “world peace” and “rights,” America’s paternal oversight was welcomed as a liberating force from the antiquated ways of despotism and ceaseless wars. Now, to attempt to revise the world order, a nation is not simply undermining the hegemony of another power, rather, a nation would be “violating human dignity,” or “international law.” Though American domestic society was itself unprepared to embrace Wilson’s framework–old habits of isolationism and insularity dying hard–his credo would reverberate in the American psyche until its maxims would again be found useful, and promulgated devoutly by Wilsonian adulators (FDR, Truman), after the conclusion of a Second World War. Thus, American power was fortified, its celestial dictums being sent in thunder to two cousin nations, one by blood and the other by liberty, worthy prophets of a new creed.
American might was once more the deus ex machina for the Allies in the Second World War. The strained diplomatic order of Versailles, punitive in nature, clashed with the morality of the League of Nations. With America having receded into its hemispheric island, the chief guardian of this post-war peace, Britain, had become demoralized in its attempt to reconcile destruction of Germany and its punishment along with a community of nations predicated on self-determination. Germany’s revisionist tendencies were thus treated with kid gloves, and the peace ultimately caved in, moral consensus expired and the aggrieved party of Germany having regained its colossal strength. After Nazi Germany’s defeat, however, the Transatlantic alliance convened again. This time, they repented of the sin of a punitive Versailles treaty and decided to not commit the blunder of being, as Machiavelli would say, half benevolent and half evil, but embark decidedly on a durable peace. A peace based on cooperation, adjudication of disputes, and dialogue between free nations–integrating the defeated powers to prevent another Hitlerian diplomatic morass. Once again, American hegemony was inevitable due to two factors: the inability of the victors to bite the American hand of lend-lease that fastidiously fed them, and the support of a European consensus which in turn commanded the recognition of the world. The former factor was a temporary one–a card to play at the negotiating table. The latter, however, was a permanent one. Edward Gibbon described the conversion of Roman plebeians to Christianity being motivated by the conversion of their patricians as the “lower classes imitating the higher,” as naturally happens in society. In the same manner, the weaker and more peripheral nations tend to imitate the strong and opulent. When the Transatlantic alliance affirmed yet again a Wilsonian conception of peace, accepted by Europe, nations previously excluded from world systems and relevance would indeed imitate their titan counterparts. Why would they not, if such behemoths were no longer speaking of a “European balance of power” but an international order for all nations? Should Europe have rejected American proposals, the nations of South America, Africa, and Asia would have looked upon another impetuous European debacle. But a Europe united behind ideals bequeathed by America that invites the world to share in the blessings of American victory and guidance is indeed worthy of the attention of such nations who wish to afford their people a place in the international community. This dynamic is fundamental for America’s purposes today. If Europe and America do not have consensus, which nation with power, strength, and authority will affirm American principles? If America becomes unable to advance its strategic interest due to a loss of credibility in the world system it created, it will be unable to stifle the emergence of its competitors. An ascendant Communist China with a strong Atlantic alliance who believe in the Western ways of democracy is an aberration that must be ameliorated. The same China in an age of a fractured and dysfunctional Atlantic alliance–a state of affairs which tempts Old World pessimism and power-politics–is but another factor in the power calculus. Perhaps it is even a partner. Even if it retains an adversarial tinge, it does not approach the repudiation out of principle that grows out of a consensus built around an American world order.
These principles and this consensus is significant not merely for the success of the American principles that have been exported, but the fact that they have become inextricable from America’s practical and strategic interest. They have become the mechanisms by which America’s adversaries are contained. For example, in the latter days of the Cold War American propagation of “human rights” and civil liberties contra Soviet authoritarianism was a means by which it could excite the peoples of the Eastern Bloc to reject Communism and embrace the West. It is important to realize that America’s foreign policy, ever ambivalent, cannot be reduced to mere power politics and a vague calculation of national interest–just as it cannot be reduced to idyllic universalism for the sake of it. What has lacked sober apprehension among many American policymakers is this fact: American strategic interest is advanced by the principles it proclaims to the world–the foundations of the international order which grant it its mandate for rule. Prater hoc factum, a corollary of this law: America cannot uphold these principles abroad without the Atlantic alliance and European consensus that makes them appealing to the world and backs them with not only military and economic strength, but also historical cultural splendor and respected diplomatic prowess.
The necessity of America’s bond with Europe has been established. It now befits our cause to assess the present state of the relationship. In the absence of the Soviet threat, the Atlantic relationship has become shrouded in ambiguity, sustained by increasingly half-hearted and perfunctory commitments to democracy and international cooperation. However, such lukewarm stump speeches cannot replace the captivating phenomenon of a civilization united toward a certain goal, necessitated by an urgent crisis. Such a faulty basis inevitably wavers under the assertion of isolation, mistaken as the furtherance of national interest. One must wonder what will hold this alliance together, as increasingly embittered disagreements and the misguided American tendency to associate the national interest with insularity become more palpable than theatrical adherence to Wilson’s aging, though not necessarily irrelevant, principles. Evidencing this very strain most starkly is the attitude of the Trump administration. Though it is quite questionable, President Trump sees no strategic value in the alliance and desired to abandon it; his cynical and pessimistic approach no doubt evinces a change in attitude. This attitude marks a shift in the American perspective of the Atlantic alliance from one of a spiritual and cultural relation, just as it is a strategic one, to a purely quid pro quo matter–an alliance of convenience. President Trump remarked in a press conference in the Oval Office to reporters: “It’s common sense, right…If they [NATO members] don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them. No, I’m not going to defend them.1” Is it entirely irrational to expect that our partners share in the responsibility in order for our own resources to be spent on our direct interest and our own citizens as much as possible? Of course not. However, this remark hints at a more significant idea. The Transatlantic relationship has become a transactional one. One cannot imagine President Truman or President Kennedy saying “if Europe does not pay more, we will not defend them from the Soviet Union.” If anything, the United States was willing to pay any cost to maintain the security of Europe and American allies–and in so doing defend America itself. If the moral significance of our alliance was clear, and if we saw it as necessary to uphold American prestige and world leadership, its price would be the least of our concerns. However, we do not see it in such a light any longer. It is no longer a matter of civilization. It is now a matter of budget. Therein lies the truth of our decaying alliance. We now view Europe as we would any other strategic partner–it’s strictly a business affair, in which case long-term moral and ideological concerns are largely tertiary. They may not factor in at all, else Trump would not be toying with arbitrary expansionism yet making little attempt to retain Atlantic consensus. As such, the sanctity of the alliance has been lost, manifested in the Zelensky-Trump Oval Office imbroglio2 of February 2025; a case study in how American leadership increasingly prefers to remind its historic partners who “has the cards” rather than retain the pivotal consensus decisive in maintaining an alliance. President Richard Nixon in 1969 said in an address to the North Atlantic Council: “As for NATO, it is precisely because it has always been more than a military alliance that its strength has been greater than the strength of arms. This alliance represents a moral force which, if we marshal it, will ennoble our efforts.” Suffice to say that the United States has ceased marshaling this moral force within NATO. Our efforts are not being ennobled. We are becoming estranged as our foreign policy loses the sense of civilizational stewardship that it once had. Our previous presidents understood this role, largely due to their perception of the reality of “Hannibal ad portas”–the Soviet Union, the antithesis of civilization, was on our doorstep. Now, however, the identity of American foreign policy becomes steeped in excessive bravado and isolationist impulses, imperiling the bond between the two pillars of the modern world, America and Europe.
The founding of NATO was not another historical incident or mere convergence of transient strategic interests. The founding of NATO and the strengthening of the Transatlantic bond was the culmination of the West. At last, the creative energies of Europe and her sons in America and Canada were united. Guns were no longer turned on European kin. For the first time, such a fruitful land could be united for the betterment of all mankind. After two World Wars introduced the American approach and was apprehended by the European psyche–both by necessity and by agreement–America and Europe was at last, linked. The convergence of these two great continents marked the beginning of a spiritual crusade which invited the whole world to be privy to. We have dashed this against the rocks. Now, it is reduced to another expense on our budget. Forsaking the christening of a West with an intelligible cause–the very cause that affected the resistance within the Soviet bloc in the pursuit of human rights and dignity–and going back on those monumental principles will leave American world leadership without a purpose. Denying the creeds it so earnestly promulgated for the past century will make it appear indecisive, confused, and we will sever the bond that has united us with Europe. Absent that, we will have no credibility nor believers in our struggle with China and Russia. We may not even recognize the struggle exists. While America has an identity crisis, China and Russia are steadfast in their pronouncements and are extending a hand to the global south. The United States will thus become incapacitated in its quest for human dignity as authoritarian and mechanistic states appeal to the world as new models of development. It will become unable to defend the honor of its system, as its cofounders of the international system cease to be proponents of it.
The divergence in America and Europe’s self perception and their understanding of their international roles renders the alliance untenable. At Europe’s gates looms Russian ambition and revisionism. European leadership is thus animated in furthering its historical role of policeman and crusader that was once imparted to her by America throughout the twentieth century. America, on the other hand, is beleaguered by an increasingly multipolar world. The advent of new strategic powers in addition to China such as India, Turkey, and Brazil have occasioned America to focus its efforts where threats to its power and interests are most acute. As of now, that is most visible and obtrusive in Asia. The Pacific and the contest with China is the primary subject of Washington’s attention. Unlike in the Cold War, America does not have the moral élan and fervor to perform another balancing act between several continents. Prioritization is thus gaining currency within the State and Defense Departments, wishing to prevent overextension which is the collapse of many an empire. The Soviet-Afghanistan disaster is an insight into how a large power drunk on hubris and convinced of its infallibility collapses through overextension. As such, the European relationship is but one of many factors in an increasingly competitive international system. Rather than securing its influence over this very system through the ideas which founded the majority of its institutions–democracy, rule of law, international adjudication–America sees each relation as a transactional one subject to a weighing of costs and benefits. This icy appraisal of Europe will not inspire America to cast herself to her utmost defense and the longevity of her institutions. The European member-states of NATO must now continuously prove their benefit to the United States and their importance in American foreign policy. Ipso facto, the long-term health of the Atlantic alliance becomes dubious at best. and irrefutably a shell of its former self which was founded, as Nixon said, on grounds that transcend the physical and practical. Fatigued by this American aloofness, Europe may very well look to itself to reinvigorate its languid industrial base. It may find desirable the prospect of capitalizing on the momentum of monetary integration to foster further political integration. This integration may be the staff with which Moses strikes a boulder to give hydration to impatient Israelites. A more united Europe will spell its own united and intelligible strategic bloc. Not being tethered, it need not be so catering to American interests when it comes to dedollarization, the Pacific showdown, and especially not unpopular Middle Eastern entanglements. America therefore has made its bed: forsaking the moral and civilizational bond that was the foundation of NATO and supplanting it with the technical and practical will convert an alliance able to last for centuries into one bound by an ever-thinning thread. Europe may very well give up on her unrequited love for Atlanticism and look to herself for her own security in light of America’s unreliability. Such a sentiment recently was expressed in the skepticism of the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. Chancellor Merz stated “We must prepare for the possibility that Donald Trump will no longer uphold NATO’s mutual defense commitment unconditionally,” continuing by saying “That is why, in my view, it is crucial that Europeans make the greatest possible efforts to ensure that we are at least capable of defending the European continent on our own.” A most melancholy statement. Throughout the history of the Atlantic alliance, there was never any question that the United States was committed to guaranteeing the security of Europe and its Atlantic partners. Differences arose, indeed, and at times the unity of the alliance in question. France’s withdrawal from the integrated NATO strategic command in 1956 bears testament to that fact. Even through those qualms however, American commitment to European security and freedom was not in question–the only question was how. Now, however, those ironclad principles have been violated due to the increasingly evanescent nature of American involvement in Europe.
What would be required for the United States to see the importance of the Transatlantic alliance and its role as custodian? Belief in its own principles and a rediscovery of its identity. One may retort that isolationism, and indeed, heeding Washington’s warning against permanent entanglements, is as American as can be. The vast differences between the 18th century and the modern day aside; the reality of our Atlantic alliance being one rooted in American principles rather than permanent strategic alliances for their own sake aside–this is not what has caused us to gradually abort our former commitments. America is experiencing a crisis of its own identity. Memories of Iraq and Afghanistan are seared into the public psyche. After a couple generations had passed, and with it, the emotional weight of the Vietnam syndrome, America had decided to test the waters in yet another protracted and overseas conflict. The ensuing fatigue that arose impressed upon the American public the feeling that it had played with fire, and it got burnt. The Vietnam syndrome reasserted itself bitterly. The ever tempting isolationist option was ever calling to us to be dusted off. It was all too easy to give into old habits. America had grown weary of saving the world and of building nations. Perhaps, as some isolationist advocates might say in some way or another, it was time to take the training wheels off the world and let it ride on its own. All right–we constructed a world order, we pioneered an International Monetary Fund, we aided the development of impoverished nations, and, with some mistakes, we allowed the entire world to have a fair shot. Now, with the rise of many “third world” nations, exactly this particular condescending axiom has been rendered anachronistic. They’re strong without us now. The enlightened modern would, as it would seem, with all its rapid methods of communication and understanding have enough answers to resolve its issues without our paternal involvement–let these nascent powers and nations integrated into the international system figure it out without our involvement that risks overextension. America must realize, however, that inclusion does not guarantee benevolence. No amount of dialogue and exchange can erase hundreds if not thousands of years of experiences which have wholly shaped the psychology of certain nations. China no doubt has had access to the American world system. It has entered the world financial and trade markets. Yet, this has not increased its reception to the American leadership and its way of life. It has only inebriated its ambitions with wealth and modernization, yet beneath this lies Communist conviction and, perhaps even more dangerous, the rediscovery of Chinese imperial glory. Washington does identify China as a strategic threat, to be sure. But the issue lies in the fact that Washington identifies this as a mere strategic disagreement that is the result of economic, military, and technological competition alone. It is, in fact, an outgrowth of civilizational and cultural differences. Were America to recognize this fact, it would not simply think in terms of contravening national interests, but in moral terms. In so doing, it would understand it needs moral weapons, and that is found in our European allies who fought beside us for a century for these same principles. Of course, Chinese civilization cannot simply be “fought” or “corrected.” Nor should it be. But indeed, the adversarial relationship is one that requires the vindication of the American system. Like the Cold War, the comparison between our missiles and aircraft carriers are mere accidents of the substance of this quarrel. The substance is, of course, the prevalence of the American system and its pervasive influence over the world system. America cannot win that battle if it decides it is not worth fighting. America cannot vindicate its system if it loses faith in it. Above all, America cannot constrain the forces that do not have the same appraisal of liberty or even mankind if it does not believe it is its role to do so. And should America rediscover a desire to do so, its prescriptions must be ratified by that ancient continent which has borne many a culture and invention, and to this day accounts for 15% of the world’s GDP.
The realist, committed to a foreign policy of national interest free from the excesses of blind idealism, chides the Wilsonian based international system as a fantastical contrivance. Such a world order fails because, as they say, we could not possibly place faith in the benevolence of foreign nations, often with far less noble motives than our own. Relinquish that which does not align with our “national interest”–even the permanence of the Atlantic alliance if need be. Forget lofty talk of international law, let us brandish our big stick in a world of perpetual anarchy. However, geopolitical realists are not thinking realistically, as it were. The Wilsonian world order, though it was created primarily out of unselfish reasons for the sake of the world, is an ideal vessel for American power–not in spite of its moralizing, but because of it. It is this order that seeks to establish world peace through the participation of all nations. In so doing, it impresses all nations with the founding principles of organizations like the United Nations, derived from the American experience and codified by Woodrow Wilson. A convergence of the nations of the world in recognizing American-breathed institutions is a tacit recognition of American leadership–by participating in a system that is guaranteed by America, these nations recognize its leadership. Revisionists, though they appear, will do so in isolation as the multitude cannot afford not to risk diplomatic recognition and economic integration.
Furthermore, the doctrine of collective security necessitates a great power to lead enforcement, a role America is naturally suited for given its modern history of policing. Above all, American interests are able to be advanced with the language of internationalism and liberalism. This legitimizes and strengthens American assertions and interests as it is done in appeal to international justice, rather than the mere power grab of a great power. Modern concepts of world progress and law do not need to be blinders and hindrances to a sober foreign policy which promotes American security and even interests abroad. Used wisely, they can become effective legitimizing labels. Indeed, the realists who so profusely consider this system as its antithesis do not realize that one of the greatest things that could be done for the American national interest and the enhancement of its power is not only the association with this system but the wholesale embracing of it. To abandon it does not allow us to execute a more “America First” foreign policy. Casting it aside would, in fact, declare to the world that America is not only reversing that which it prescribed to all corners of the earth for a century, but that it is not interested in being the world’s custodian. In that vacuum, less benevolent and more ambitious powers may assert themselves at our expense. Indeed, despite the ruminations of the realist, American leadership and American power are synonymous with this world order. It is precisely out of a realist perspective that this fact must be reconciled to the national interest. Should American interests be prioritized, yet our role as father of the Wilsonian international system be maintained, two things shall be achieved. One, the United States will hold onto its role as world leader and advance its interests by the language of historical progress. Two, the United States will guard against both the excesses of an altruistic and principles-based foreign policy and a more belligerent Hobbesian foreign policy. A keen consideration of the national interest will allow our approach to the international system to be one that conduces national strength rather than unconditional commitment to Wilson’s original vision for its own sake. This middle road–a media vita between radical puritanism and sclerotic catholicism, as it were–is not unlike Nixon’s sophisticated synthesis of power politics and continuity of America’s role as guardian of world liberty. But this consideration of Wilsonianism’s utility needn’t entail a superficial and disingenuous affirmation of ideals we do not truly believe in. Freedom, democracy, free enterprise, whichever concepts are most prominently associated with Wilson’s brainchild, may still be the object of our belief and devotion. It simply is a function of historical law that, as the guarantor of these concepts, what is good for the United States is good for these blessings. As Cardinal Richelieu may say–what is good for France is good for the Church. Talis qualis, what is good for America is good for the free world.
But how does the Atlantic alliance fit into this framework of Wilsonian realism? As mentioned earlier, they were our cofounders in this international system. If the United States is to maintain its role as world leader, their recognition of our guardianship of collective security is a necessary prerequisite. Otherwise, our claim becomes dubious–and certainly, if we become estranged from our closest historical allies, there would be far less of a reason for other nations of the world to rely on our steadfast support. The status of Europe, and especially Western Europe as having been the progenitor of Enlightenment ideals and notions of modern freedom, as mentioned earlier, has an enormous moral weight. Other nations look to Europe and America for moral direction when it comes to international affairs. A great divorce would simply lead to disillusionment–the recoiling of both parties from their priestly roles into cynical, mechanical foreign policies will give no one nation or bloc a right to world leadership. The very idea of world leadership is inherently moral and philosophical. That is the reason America has had a largely unquestioned tenure as the “leader of the free world,” save a few pariah dictators. However, if the superpower that is America chooses to redefine foreign policy in strictly technical and geostrategic terms, pushing away Europe, other nations will likely follow suit. And with that abandonment of moral standards for international relations, the Old World foreign policy reality of bellum omnium contra omnes–a survival of the fittest, will reassert itself. America being isolated, it may very well be China that, by way of raw power and engagement with the global south, will replace an apostate America.
The possibility of Chinese rapprochement and detente with Europe cannot be dismissed. Washington believes it may disengage from its erstwhile promises and catechisms without the reciprocation of our former Atlantic alliance, contented with unrequited love. Foreign policy is, of course, never so simple, and nations are never so steadfast–the very reason principles and moral doctrines are paramount for Atlantic consensus and thereby American power. Indeed, if America should become increasingly estranged from Europe, and in its disaffected state Europe looks to itself for security, it may constitute a phenomenon similar to the Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War. What these non-aligned leaders such as Nasser and Tito understood was that, by professing neutrality in a world where every nation is a political battleground between two powers, it is these two powers that would court them. Shrewd as they were, non-aligned leaders realized that playing two superpowers off each other enables them to extract favorable concessions from both sides, leveraging the possibility of becoming an asset for the “other” side. For instance, this balancing act allowed Gamal Nasser, President of Egypt, to lead on both Soviet Russia and America to extract increased foreign aid and arms supplies, impressing upon them the belief that more support and recognition of his administration would eventually push Egypt into one camp or the other. Were Europe to become isolated from America, engaging China through a relaxation of tensions–reminiscent of Nixon’s detente–would increase Europe’s amount of geopolitical options and reverse the increased isolation a recalcitrant America would manifest. The United States would lose a critical asset that was so vital in the furtherance of its strategic interests, by military, economic, and political cooperation, which would now be using its energies and large economy to potentially make concessions to China. Such a reality would be the death knell of American world leadership and would make the world a definitively multipolar international system. Yet another cost would be imposed on Washington’s Pacific strategy. America would thus be attempting to manage Russian ambition, the Middle Eastern powder keg, China’s ascendancy, which now threatens American interests in Latin America and Africa, and finally, a European neutrality that risks American overextension in its attempt to retain its hegemony and interests across nearly every continent, yet with increasingly fewer allies and recognition. This would impose tangible economic costs on the United States, but above all a political and domestic fatigue that may lead to a wholesale unraveling similar to that of the USSR’s post-Afghanistan crisis. In any case, American withdrawal from being the preeminent superpower may be the only exit strategy to avert Armageddon and American estrangement. Such is the precarious situation that arises in the absence of our affirmation of the Wilsonian system and with it, the Atlantic alliance.
This Atlantic question is not merely one of foreign policy interests and successes. Ultimately, the most significant element is the civilizational one. American leaders, in their talk of budgets and “paying a fair share,” do not seem interested in lofty concepts such as “civilization” and the vindication of the “American system.” Suppose a case is truly to be made for the preservation of our old Atlantic alliance in an age where it is increasingly popular to deride it. In that case, these inestimable concepts must be explained. Firstly, foreign policy is the expression of a nation’s identity and spirit, as has been touched upon throughout this article. Just as one reads mood by the expression of a face, one may similarly read a nation by the expression of foreign policy. When America sat down at the victors table at the First World War, it boldly and perhaps overconfidently proclaimed its own system, carrying with it the almost naive optimism and faith in its principles which it had acquired in the interior success of its system free from foreign intrusion. A clear glimpse into how America’s titanic economy, undefeated status in war, and unrivaled democratic system convinced it of its Providential nature. It felt justified in presenting the Ten Commandments–Wilson’s Fourteen Points, rather. In 1956, France exited NATO’s integrated military command in 1956 over Atlantic disagreements about its acquiring a nuclear arsenal. This was not out of character. France, historically a political leader of Europe, always sought ways to reassert its leadership, even more so when it resented its declining status. The eminent statesman that was DeGaulle was merely an embodiment of the intransigence of French pride. With these examples in mind, foreign policy becomes a matter not of arbitrary technical calculations, but the expressions of a Volksgeist, to borrow a term from Hegel. Understanding this, America’s cynical approach to foreign policy and hesitancy to embrace its historical role indeed is a reflection of its society and its growing incapacity to think in terms of civilization–an ability Kissinger remarked to William F. Buckley Jr. that an American president should be able to do.
What is the significance of America not being able to think in terms of civilization? In other words, what is to be understood about America’s lack of acknowledgment, not even belief, of its own unique role, its identity–perfunctory posturing aside? This must be first answered with another question. Do we value American culture and civilization? In a word, do we value the American way of life and the unique contributions of its people? Alexis de Tocqueville thought so–America’s exceptionality occasioned him to refer to it as just that. The American nation has been distinguished by unparalleled achievements of its people, whether cultural, technological, or political. Aiding this was its unique system. It was a republic, yes, but so was Revolutionary France. One ended in a “land of opportunity” which planted its flag on the moon. The latter became regarded as a land of terror which planted the heads of its countrymen on pikes. Undoubtedly, the serene restraint which was instituted by the Constitution–its genius lying not only within its ideas but its permanence–allowed for freedom and the inability of man to destroy that freedom in spite of his great agency. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into comprehensive political philosophy, but the fact stands that America is an exceptional nation. A platitude, a trope? Perhaps, but one that is becoming a historical artifact rather than a living reality. Thus, it must be asseverated now more than ever. If we conclude that America’s unique system is indeed valuable, and its sharing of the blessings of that system with the world through its largely beneficent intervention, then a mighty conclusion follows: America must perceive itself not merely as a power, but a civilization. Powers come and go. Indeed they are shakeable. A civilization, however, transforms the world. It excites its people to an ardent defense and even expansion of it because of its beauty–because of the truth they see in it. Our politicians insult our heritage when their conception of the world devolves into one of reflexiveness and “pragmatism.” Realism is indeed a prudent guide, but the American experience shows that a realism that is not done in the service of an even unrealistic optimism is one that entails the triumph over means over ends. Thus, the American civilization, system, way of life, call it what you will, is worth preserving, and it is this beautiful fact that must inform our approach to foreign policy. When General Eisenhower wrote his famous address to the Allied troops that were to land on Normandy, he did not say “you are about to embark on a great defense of our strategic interest.” He intrepidly declared “you are about to embark on a great crusade.” The spirit of crusade conquered those beaches. That spirit has left us. The spirit of cynicism and blasé calculation conquers nothing.
The case for informing American foreign policy on the basis of its exceptional civilizational identity has been made. In it, we will rediscover our Katechontic role of restraining chaotic forces. But in our rediscovery of this, we would see that affirming the Atlantic alliance is of paramount importance precisely because of the gravitas of moral and spiritual considerations. To uphold our spiritual role would require those former churchmen of Europe which as has been exhausted by now, cannot be done in the lens of the technical. This foreign policy is not confused idealism, for it guides us to embracing the powerful Atlantic alliance which can truly only be sustained through the consensus built on moral, cultural, and civilizational understanding. Recovering that great pillar, the billions of the Earth will be able to pass underneath the arch of American world leadership to a freer world.